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INTRODUCTION 
Since China established its modern intellectual property system in 
the early 1980s, policymakers, industries, commentators, and the media 
have widely criticized its failure to adequately protect intellectual 
property rights holders.1 From the repeated threats of the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) to impose unilateral trade sanctions in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s,2 to China’s need for greater compliance 
with international intellectual property standards in the run-up to its 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the early 2000s,3 
to the ongoing disputes between China and the United States over the 
former’s failure to adequately protect and enforce intellectual property 
rights, mainstream media have been filled with clichéd stories about 
China’s massive piracy and counterfeiting problems.4 In a recent report, 
 
 1 China introduced its trademark law in 1982, patent law in 1984, and copyright law in 1990. 
For the Author’s earlier discussions of the Chinese intellectual property system, see generally 
Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-
First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to Partners I]; Peter 
K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO 
China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to Partners II]; Peter K. Yu, 
Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN 
A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007) [hereinafter Yu, China Puzzle]; Peter K. Yu, 
The Middle Kingdom and the Intellectual Property World, 13 OR. REV. INT’L L. 209 (2011) 
[hereinafter Yu, Middle Kingdom]. 
 2 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra note 1, at 140–48 (discussing the United States’ 
use of unilateral sanctions to pressure China to reform its intellectual property system). 
 3 On December 11, 2001, China became the 143rd member of the WTO. See generally 
Symposium, China and the WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 
(2003) (discussing the ramifications of China’s entry into the WTO). 
 4 For discussions of the recent WTO dispute between China and the United States on the 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, see generally Panel Report, China—
Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 
WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter WTO Panel Report]; Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS 
Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046 (2011); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and 
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the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) estimated that 
“firms in the U.S. IP [intellectual property]–intensive economy that 
conducted business in China in 2009 reported losses of approximately 
$48.2 billion in sales, royalties, or license fees due to IPR [intellectual 
property rights] infringement in China.”5 
In recent years, however, the discourse on intellectual property 
developments in China has slowly begun to change.6 Such a change is 
the most notable in the patent area. Today, China is already among the 
top five countries filing patent applications through the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT).7 In 2011, the number of PCT applications 
increased by 33.4% to 16,406, earning China the fourth spot, behind 
only the United States, Japan, and Germany.8 Among all the applicants, 
ZTE Corporation (formerly Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment 
Corporation) and Huawei Technologies, both Chinese firms, had the 
largest and third largest number of PCT applications, respectively. By 
contrast, Panasonic Corporation and Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha, both 
Japanese firms, had only the second and fourth largest number of PCT 
applications, respectively. U.S.-based Qualcomm placed the distant 
sixth. 
Earlier that year, the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) 
released a highly ambitious document outlining its National Patent 
Development Strategy for 2011–2020.9 Included in the 2015 targets 
were the following goals: 
The annual quantity of applying for patents for inventions, utility 
models and designs [in the country] will reach 2 million. China will 
rank among the top two in the world in terms of the annual number 
of patents for inventions granted to the domestic applicants, and the 
quality of patents filed will further improve. The number of owning 
patents every one million people and the number of overseas patent 
applications filed by Chinese applicants will double. The proportion 
of patent applications in industrial enterprises above designated size 
will reach 8% and the quantity of owning patent rights will 
 
Developing Countries, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 727 (2011). 
 5 U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, INV. NO. 332-519, USITC PUB. 4226, CHINA: EFFECTS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AND INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES ON THE U.S. 
ECONOMY xiv (2011). 
 6 See Peter K. Yu, The Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34 CAMPBELL 
L. REV. 525, 529–32 (2012) [hereinafter Yu, Rise and Decline] (pointing out that China is at the 
cusp of crossing over from a pirating nation to a country respectful of intellectual property rights). 
 7 All the figures from this paragraph are taken from Press Release, World Intellectual Prop. 
Org., International Patent Filings Set New Record in 2011 (Mar. 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2012/article_0001.html. 
 8 The estimated figures for the United States, Japan, and Germany were 48,596, 38,888, and 
18,568, respectively. Id. 
 9 STATE INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE [SIPO], NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGY (2011–2020) (2011), translated at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/ 
business/SIPONatPatentDevStrategy.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGY]. 
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significantly rise. . . . The patent transaction services will be 
established in major cities of China with annual patent transaction 
amounts reaching 100 billion yuan. . . . The patent examiner[s] will 
reach 9,000. . . . The talents in the patent service industry will be 
greater and the professional categories will be more complete, with 
certified patent agents reaching 10,000.10 
In the past few years, SIPO has also been actively developing 
professional ties with leading patent offices from around the world. As 
early as 2007, SIPO officials met with their counterparts from the 
European Patent Office, the Japanese Patent Office, the Korean 
Intellectual Property Office, and the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) to discuss ways to “improv[e] the 
efficiency of their examination systems and to harmonize their office 
systems.”11 These so-called “IP5” discussions, which remain ongoing, 
further strengthen SIPO’s status as “a player in the top tier of patent 
offices that will dominate the emerging system of global patent 
administration.”12 
In view of these major developments in the patent area, it is high 
time we rethink the accuracy and suitability of the traditional discourse 
on intellectual property developments in China. To help achieve this 
feat, this Article focuses on five key questions that I have been 
repeatedly asked in presentations or conferences exploring recent 
intellectual property developments in China. As the answers will 
suggest, the future of the Chinese intellectual property system is rather 
complex. This future reflects neither a rosy picture of China’s “great 
leap forward” in the intellectual property arena nor a continuously 
gloomy picture of pirates and counterfeiters. Instead, the picture is 
dualistic and highly dynamic. It includes both yin and yang—the yin of 
continued massive piracy and counterfeiting and the yang of China’s 
rise as a patent power. 
I.     QUESTION 1: HOW IS THE QUALITY OF CHINESE PATENTS? 
When The New York Times interviewed former USPTO director 
David Kappos about SIPO’s National Patent Development Strategy, he 
described the 2015 target numbers as “mind-blowing.”13 Although 
SIPO’s strategy provided many different data points, media and 
commentators thus far have focused considerably on the SIPO’s 
projection that China’s patent applications will reach two million per 
 
 10 Id. at 4–5. 
 11 PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES AND 
THEIR CLIENTS 236 (2010). 
 12 Id. at 233. Since 1994, the Chinese Patent Office, and later SIPO, has served as an 
international searching authority for PCT purposes. Id. 
 13 Steve Lohr, When Innovation, Too, Is Made in China, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2011, at BU3. 
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year.14 This focus is understandable: if that target is reached, SIPO will 
handle a total of at least ten million patent applications during 2015–
2020! 
Taking note of this gigantic number, one cannot help but wonder if 
SIPO’s forecast is accurate and realistic. One may further query whether 
the highly ambitious goals set by the National Patent Development 
Strategy, if met, will result in a quick deterioration of the overall quality 
of Chinese patents.15 For example, policymakers, commentators, and 
practitioners expressed concern over the perverse incentives created by 
the Chinese government’s subsidies for patenting activities, which they 
claimed would distort the total number of domestic applications.16 
Likewise, Mark Liang questioned SIPO’s ability to thoroughly examine 
these patents and by extension the quality of Chinese patents: 
[T]here is reason to doubt whether the quality of the patents being 
applied for and granted in China. The burst in Chinese patenting 
activity is a product in large part from the Central Government’s 
“innovation agenda,”—a leading component of which are generous 
 
 14 See, e.g., id.; DAN PRUD’HOMME, DULLING THE CUTTING-EDGE: HOW PATENT-RELATED 
POLICIES AND PRACTICES HAMPER INNOVATION IN CHINA 6 (2012), available at 
http://www.europeanchamber.com.cn/upload/media/media/27/patentstudy2012%5B766%5D.pdf. 
 15 Cf. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR 
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 12 (2004) (“[T]he rapid increase in the rate of patenting has been accompanied by a 
proliferation of patent awards of dubious merit.”). 
 16 As noted in a Reuters article: 
[L]egal experts said China would need to do more before it can lead the world in 
innovation as the quality of patents needed to improve. 
The government provided attractive incentives for companies in China to file 
patent applications, regardless of whether a patent was eventually granted, they said. 
“The idea of subsidizing patents is not bad in itself, however it is a blunt 
instrument because you get high figures for filings, but it does not tell you anything 
about the quality of the patents filed,” said Elliot Papageorgiou, a Partner and 
Executive at law firm Rouse Legal (China). 
“One thing is volume, quality is quite another. The return, or the percentage of 
grants, of the patents is still not as high in China as, say, in the U.S., Japan or some 
places in Europe,” he said. 
Lee Chyen Yee, China Tops U.S., Japan to Become Top Patent Filer, REUTERS, Dec. 21, 2011, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/21/us-china-patents-idUSTRE7BK0LQ20111221. An 
article in The Economist concurred: 
[T]here are reasons for scepticism. The bureaucrats in Chinese patent offices are paid 
more if they approve more patents, say local lawyers. That must tempt them to say yes 
to ideas of dubious originality. And the generosity of China’s incentives for patent-
filing may make it worthwhile for companies and individuals to patent even worthless 
ideas. “Patents are easy to file,” says Tony Chen, a patent attorney with Jones Day in 
Shanghai, “but gems are hard to find in a mountain of junk.” 
A cottage industry has sprung up to produce patents of suspect value. On Taobao, 
the Chinese eBay, patent writers and filers advertise their services for as little as 700 
yuan for individuals or 2,000 yuan for corporations. Most of these patents are probably 
filed with the expectation that they will be ignored. 
Innovation in China: Patents, Yes; Ideas, Maybe, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2010, at 78. 
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incentives for patent filings. For example, Chinese companies who 
file above a certain number of patents receive significant tax breaks. 
Tenure is more likely for university professors who are able to obtain 
patents. Patent application fees for qualifying individuals and 
companies are entirely subsidized by local governments. These 
incentives, among others, are all part and parcel of the agenda’s 
stated goal of 2 million patent filings (of any type) by 2015, making 
China’s SIPO far and away the world’s busiest patent office.17 
Most recently, Dan Prud’homme, the business manager of the IPR 
Working Group and R&D Forum at the European Union Chamber of 
Commerce in China, published a highly critical report documenting the 
myriad problems confronting the Chinese patent system.18 Focusing 
again on patent quality, the report declared: 
While patents are exploding in China and certain innovation is also 
on the rise, patent quality has not proportionately kept up and in fact 
the overall strength of China’s actual innovation appears overhyped. 
Statistical analysis in this study not only reveals concerning trends in 
the quality of China’s patents at present, but suggests that while 
patent filings in China will likely continue to notably grow in the 
future, patent quality may continue to lag these numbers. In fact, 
projections in this study indicate there might be over 2.6 million less-
than-“highest-quality” patents filed in China in 2015 alone, which is 
substantially more than estimated “highest-quality” patents filings in 
that year. With this in mind, and objectively considering its 
performance on additional innovation metrics, it is clear that China’s 
innovation ecosystem deserves a new type of scrutiny.19 
The report further discussed “how a network of patent-related policies, 
other measures, and practices in China collectively hamper both patent 
quality and innovation at large.”20 It ended with the conclusion that 
“overall, China still lags behind many developed countries in terms of 
innovation at large and quality patents in particular, let alone 
breakthrough innovation and highest-quality patents.”21 
While criticisms directed at the Chinese patent system are not 
unfounded, it is important to think about whether an overly heavy focus 
on patent metrics or targets would lead one to miss the forest for the 
trees. To begin with, the two million figure collectively covers three 
different types of patents: invention patents, utility model patents, and 
design patents. While invention patents are granted only after careful 
 
 17 Mark Liang, Chinese Patent Quality: Running the Numbers and Possible Remedies, 11 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 478, 482 (2012) (footnotes omitted). 
 18 PRUD’HOMME, supra note 14. 
 19 Id. at 1 (emphasis omitted). 
 20 Id. These policies, measures and practices include “government-set patent targets and 
indicators . . . ; policies and other measures meant to promote patents . . . ; and rules and 
procedures for reviewing patent applications and those for enforcing patents.” Id. 
 21 Id. at 19. 
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substantive examinations by patent agents, utility models and designs 
are granted without any substantive examination.22 Similar to 
innovation patents in Australia, Gebrauchsmuster in Germany, short-
term patents in Hong Kong, utility models in Japan or South Korea, or 
petty patents in Indonesia or Thailand,23 the utility model patent in 
China “was set up to invite broader participation in inventive 
enterprises, especially by smaller collective enterprises and private 
citizens who are less likely to have resources devoted to invention 
patents.”24 As a result, the inventiveness required for utility model 
applications is much lower than that required for invention patent 
applications.25 
Thus, if accurate comparisons are to be made between China and 
other countries—say, the United States—it is important to focus on 
invention patents alone—or, even better, patents for domestic inventions 
alone.26 In 2011, for example, the total number of applications for and 
grants of patents for domestic inventions in China were 415,829 and 
 
 22 See Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 39–40 (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 2009) 
(China), translated at http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/lawsregulations/200804/ 
t20080416_380327.html (requiring substantive examination for invention patents, but only 
preliminary examination for utility model and design patents). 
 23 See Uma Suthersanen, Utility Models and Innovation in Developing Countries 40–42 
(UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development Series, Issue Paper No. 13, 
2006); see also id. at 1 (“There are currently approximately 75 countries which provide, in some 
form or another, utility model protection. . . . [M]ajor industrial nations which have adopted the 
utility model regime include Japan, South Korea and Germany.”); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual 
Property and Asian Values, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 329, 389–90 (2012) (noting the 
importance of utility models and other alternative innovation models to developing countries). 
For discussions of utility models, see generally INNOVATION WITHOUT PATENTS: HARNESSING 
THE CREATIVE SPIRIT IN A DIVERSE WORLD (Uma Suthersanen, Graham Dutfield & Kit Boey 
Chow eds., 2007); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The International Legal Framework for the 
Protection of Utility Models, 4 WIPO J. (forthcoming 2013); Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent 
Protection, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 151 (1999); Suthersanen, supra. 
 24 PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 170 (2d ed. 2003). 
 25 As Dan Prud’homme wrote: 
[O]n one hand, given their higher invalidation rates and higher risk of being filed 
solely for and used in “malicious prosecution actions,” utility models are considered of 
lower quality than invention patents. On the other hand, it is important to recognise that 
a variety of evidence debunks the idea that utility model patents are always of low 
value, whereas a range of empirical studies show that the utility model system in 
certain countries successfully enables movement from relatively low levels of 
innovation and competitiveness, and poor diffusion of technology, to higher levels. 
PRUD’HOMME, supra note 14, at 3. 
 26 Similarly, Mark Liang observed: 
[I]n assessing the inventive prowess of the two countries, the relevant figure should be 
the number of indigenous patent filings. Foreign filings say nothing about each 
country’s inventiveness and should therefore be excluded. In sum, a proper comparison 
is the number of Chinese-origin invention applications filed at the SIPO versus the 
number of U.S.-origin utility applications at the PTO. 
Liang, supra note 17, at 490 (footnote omitted). 
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112,347, respectively.27 Those figures already exceeded the 
corresponding figures in the United States, which amounted to only 
247,750 and 108,626, respectively.28 
Although one could argue that the quality of invention patents in 
China compares less favorably with that of the United States, it is 
important not to lose sight of the fact that the number of patent 
applications for domestic inventions in China can only increase—and, 
in my view, increase rapidly. At some point, that number would be so 
enormous that quantity would present a much bigger problem than 
quality. As Mark Cohen, the former senior intellectual property attaché 
at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, pointed out in an interview: 
“[S]ometimes quantity is quality in patents, at least in terms of 
litigation. Having a thicket of patents that one can assert can be very 
meaningful in driving a license or a settlement.”29 If the so-called 
“national champions” in China,30 such as ZTE Corporation and Huawei 
Technologies, are able to acquire a large number of patents, they likely 
will have a significant advantage over foreign firms having a much 
smaller number. 
Second, when one takes into consideration the total number of 
current patent applications in China, the two million figure is not as 
unrealistic as it sounds. According to the official statistics, the total 
number of patent applications in 2011 already reached 1,633,347.31 That 
number represented a growth rate of about 34%, up from 1,222,286 in 
2010. Out of these applications, 526,412 were for invention patents, 
409,836 for utility models, and 421,273 for designs. If the projected 
growth rate for all patents combined is a meager 5.2%, China will have 
reached two million patent applications by 2015. With a growth rate of 
about 34% in 2011, it is hard to imagine how that rate could drastically 
slow down to less than 5.2% even if one assumes that the global 
economic crisis has significantly slowed down patent applications in 
 
 27 SIPO, Table 1 Distribution of Applications for Inventions Received from Home and 
Abroad, http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/2011/12/201201/t20120116_641774.html (Jan. 16, 
2012); SIPO, Table 4 Distribution of Grants for Inventions Received from Home and Abroad, 
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/2011/12/201201/t20120116_641766.html (Jan. 16, 2012). 
 28 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963–2011, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last modified May 21, 2012). 
 29 Whitney Stenger, Mark Cohen: Global Intellectual Property Ambassador, 15 SMU SCI. & 
TECH. L. REV. 41, 45 (2011). 
 30 See ODED SHENKAR, COPYCATS: HOW SMART COMPANIES USE IMITATION TO GAIN A 
STRATEGIC EDGE 158 (2010) (noting “the government’s strategy of consolidating strategic 
industries . . . to create national champions that can hold their own in global markets and . . . to 
restore its imperial glory”); TOM DOCTOROFF, WHAT CHINESE WANT: CULTURE, COMMUNISM 
AND THE MODERN CHINESE CONSUMER 15–16 (2012) (discussing China’s mobilization of 
resources for critical strategic undertakings at the national level). 
 31 All the figures in this paragraph are taken from SIPO, Comparative Table 1 Contemporary 
Quantity Comparison of Three Kinds of Patents Received from Home and Abroad Between 2010 
and 2011, http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/2011/12/201201/t20120116_641768.html (Jan. 16, 
2012). 
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China. 
Third, while it is fair to question the quality of Chinese patents, it 
is more insightful to compare the actual patent quality across countries, 
as opposed to making comparisons based on idealistic standards.32 In 
the United States, for example, the low quality of patents granted by the 
USPTO had led to repeated calls for patent reform.33 These reform 
demands eventually led to the recent adoption of the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act34 and a complete overhaul of the U.S. patent 
system. More than a decade ago before the adoption of this statute, 
commentators and practitioners alike began vocally criticizing the low 
quality of U.S. patents, which they attributed to “budgetary limitations, 
an exploding filing rate, and the increasing range of patentable subject 
matter.”35 In a widely cited study, John Allison and Mark Lemley 
showed shockingly that U.S. courts had found the patent invalid in 46% 
of the 300 final validity decisions examined.36 Recently, Carlos Correa 
also observed: 
In the US . . . , patent owner’s likelihood of success in patent validity 
challenges is only 51 per cent if the trial is heard before a judge 
alone. If the trial is heard before a judge and jury: 68 per cent. 
Overall chances of success for the patent owner if the trial is held in 
Massachusetts and Northern California, respectively: 30 per cent, 68 
per cent.37 
If these observations indeed reflect the actual quality of U.S. patents, 
one has to wonder whether the concern over the quality of Chinese 
patents is significantly different from the criticism of low patent quality 
in other parts of the world. 
Fourth, evaluating patent quality is inherently difficult. As Dan 
Prud’homme reminded us: 
There has long been a debate on what exactly a definition of “patent 
quality” should entail. One conventional definition is that patent 
 
 32 Cf. Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1, 13 (2010) 
(questioning whether researchers should “measure the countries against an idealised yardstick of 
effective intellectual property protection and enforcement” when they make cross-country 
comparisons of piracy and counterfeiting). 
 33 For discussions of problems within the U.S. patent system, see generally U.S. FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT 
LAW AND POLICY (2003); JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 15; A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004). 
 34 Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 35 John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches to Patent 
Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727, 728 (2002). 
 36 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998). 
 37 Carlos M. Correa, The Push for Stronger Enforcement Rules: Implications for Developing 
Countries, in INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., ISSUE PAPER NO. 22, THE GLOBAL 
DEBATE ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 27, 67 n.84 (2009). 
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quality is determined by legal compliance with core statutory 
requirements for patentability. Others look at the commercial value 
of a patent, and in the same vein look at patents that are maintained 
over an extended amount of time such that they can be 
commercialised to make profits. Yet others suggest that patents that 
are not commercially valuable can still be of good quality according 
to statutory criteria. Some use frequency of patent citations in patent 
literature and also sometimes in non-patent literature as a gauge of 
the significance of a patent and thus its quality. Some define quality 
in relative terms, whereas higher quality patents exclusively refer to 
inventions that would not have been made without the incentive 
afforded by their patent protection. Yet others, particularly observers 
of China’s patent system, appear to only consider invention patents 
as of good quality, whereas all non-invention patents (or utility 
models in particular), are “junk” (low quality). Yet other definitions 
may be used.38 
Focusing on the specific Chinese context, Mark Cohen further declared: 
It is . . . very hard to benchmark the quality of individual patents. By 
China’s own data, quality is improving. By certain patent quality 
surrogate data—such as the number of service versus non-service 
inventions, patents that are commercialized, field of use, whether 
patents are maintained throughout their useful life, type of patents 
(invention patent versus utility model or designs)—there are more 
and more patent grants that have commercial viability. However, 
there are no citation rates. So in other words, it cannot be determined 
if a particular patent has been cited by subsequent patents. That 
would be a very important, perhaps the most important, indicator of 
patent quality. Whether patents are filed internationally though the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) or through national phase filings 
would be another important indicator, as international filings are 
generally reserved for higher quality patents due to their cost and 
international significance. 
Field of use is especially critical. It is very hard to analyze bulk 
patent data, because one patent in the bio-tech or pharmaceutical 
(pharma) sector can be significantly more valuable than five hundred 
in the IT sector. There have not been many blockbuster pharma 
products coming out of China, so one cannot really equate 10,000 
patents in China’s IT sector to 10,000 patents in the pharma sector. 
Perhaps the most significant new medicines have in fact been based 
on traditional Chinese medicine, like Artemisinin and Tamiflu. On 
the other hand, there used to be many patents related to food 
products, fermentation, and the like in China that probably had very 
limited commercial use. There has also been a closer alignment 
between what China manufacturers are producing in the IT sector 
 
 38 PRUD’HOMME, supra note 14, at 22 (footnotes omitted). 
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and what Chinese inventors are patenting. This is a positive sign.39 
Finally, the important point about China’s recent developments in 
the patent area is not so much about how many patent applications SIPO 
will receive by 2015 or how many patents the office will eventually 
grant. Rather, it is about how China’s patent system has quickly turned 
around in fewer than thirty years. From the “four patents and six 
inventor certificates” granted between 1950 and 1963,40 to a world 
record–breaking 3,455 applications filed on April 1, 1985 (the first day 
the Patent Law went into effect),41 to the two million patent applications 
SIPO now projects for 2015, the Chinese patent system has indeed 
come a very long way. 
In fact, this system has arguably accomplished what no other 
patent system in the world has ever achieved—be it the system in 
Germany, Japan, or the United States. Thus, as much as mainstream 
media are content with perpetuating the decades-old discussion of 
massive piracy and counterfeiting in China, and as much as industries 
continue to demand tighter measures to enforce intellectual property 
rights, one has to wonder whether these two groups have missed some 
very important recent developments concerning the Chinese patent 
system. Today, China already has the world’s largest volume of 
domestic patent applications. It is only a matter of time before China 
overtakes the United States, Japan, and Germany to become the world’s 
leader in filing international patent applications. 
II.     QUESTION 2: WHAT DO CHINESE POLICYMAKERS HAVE IN MIND 
WHEN THEY MENTION “INDEPENDENT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY”? 
Although highly ambitious, SIPO’s National Patent Development 
Strategy does not represent an isolated effort undertaken by an 
individual government agency. Instead, it was “formulated for the 
purpose of thoroughly implementing the Outline of the National 
 
 39 Stenger, supra note 22, at 45–46. Mark Liang concurred: 
Patent quality is inherently difficult to quantify using numeric metrics. Assessing the 
objective “value” of a patent or the inventiveness of a patent is an imprecise science 
that presents a number of normative and positive issues. Measuring the quality of the 
patent examination process also presents a number of challenges—what measures may 
be used to assess efficiency, thoroughness, and accuracy? 
Even assuming that the quality of patents or their examination can be measured 
using some number or score, there remains the issue of how to calculate the score. 
What variables and formulas should the calculation use? The challenge is all the more 
daunting with China and the SIPO, given the relative lack of transparency and 
available data. 
Liang, supra note 17, at 491–92 (footnote omitted). 
 40 PETER GANEA & THOMAS PATTLOCH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINA 3 (2005). 
 41 FENG, supra note 24, at 168. 
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Intellectual Property Strategy.”42 Released in June 2008, this Outline 
laid out the State Council’s comprehensive plan to improve the 
protection and management of intellectual property rights in China.43 
Paragraph 7 specifically emphasized the need for active development of 
“zizhu zhishi chanquan,”44 which is translated herein as “independent 
intellectual property.” As the Paragraph stated: 
The level of the self-relied intellectual property will be higher by a 
large margin and the quantity of intellectual property will be greater. 
China will rank among the advanced countries of the world in terms 
of the annual number of patents for inventions granted to the 
domestic applicants, while the number of overseas patent 
applications filed by Chinese applicants should greatly increase. A 
number of world-famous brands will emerge. The proportion of the 
GDP accounted for by the value of core copyright industries will 
greatly increase. China should own the rights to a number of high-
quality new varieties of plants and high-level layout-designs of 
integrated circuits. Trade secrets, geographical indications, genetic 
resources, traditional knowledge as well as folklores will be 
effectively protected and reasonably utilized.45 
Paragraph 7 further identified three other goals for 2008–2013: 
— The benefits of utilizing . . . IPRs . . . will be increased 
significantly and the proportion of products rich in IPRs should grow 
significantly. Enterprises should make progress in improving their 
system for managing intellectual property, invest more in the area of 
intellectual property and significantly improve their capacity to 
utilize intellectual property in market competition. A number of 
preponderant enterprises with famous brands, core intellectual 
property and rich experience in utilizing the intellectual property 
system will emerge. 
— The protection of IPRs will be significantly improved. 
Infringement of IPRs, such as piracy and counterfeiting, should be 
significantly reduced, the expense of protecting intellectual property 
right will decrease a great deal and abuse of intellectual property 
should be effectively curbed. 
— The awareness of the IPRs in society, especially among market 
entities, will be greatly enhanced and a favorable intellectual 
property culture should be basically formed.46 
Launched shortly before the adoption of the Third Amendment to 
 
 42 NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY, supra note 9, pmbl. 
 43 STATE COUNCIL, OUTLINE OF THE NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY 
(2008), translated at http://english.gov.cn/2008-06/21/content_1023471.htm [hereinafter 
NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY]. 
 44 Id. ¶ 7. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 90 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE•NOVO  2013 
the Chinese Patent Law,47 the State Council’s National Intellectual 
Property Strategy dovetailed the growing recognition by the fourth-
generation Chinese leadership of the economic and strategic importance 
of a well-functioning intellectual property system. As President Hu 
Jintao remarked in the Group Study of the Political Bureau of the 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in May 2006: 
Strengthening the building of China’s system of intellectual property 
right and vigorously upgrading the capacity of creation, 
management, protection and application regarding intellectual 
property are our urgent need for the purpose of enhancing 
independent and self-driven innovation capabilities and building an 
innovation-oriented country.48 
Likewise, Premier Wen Jiabo observed: “One thing necessary to stress 
is the need to concretely strengthen IP protection. In the new era, global 
science and technology competition, as well as economic competition, 
is primarily a competition of IP rights. Promoting IP protection 
therefore promotes and inspires innovation.”49 
At a much broader economic level, both the State Council’s 
National Intellectual Property Strategy and SIPO’s National Patent 
Development Strategy tied well to a growing array of nationwide 
initiatives launched to promote independent innovation (zizhu 
chuangxin).50 Such promotion indeed has been designated as one of the 
four guiding principles in the Outline of the National Medium- and 
Long-Term Plan for Science and Technology Development (2006–
2020).51 Published in February 2006, this fifteen-year plan formally 
 
 47 See generally Peter K. Yu, Building the Ladder: Three Decades of Development of the 
Chinese Patent System, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON PATENT LAW (Margo Bagley & Ruth 
Okediji eds., forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Yu, Building the Ladder] (discussing the Third 
Amendment to the Chinese Patent Law). 
 48 Wu Handong, One Hundred Years of Progress: The Development of the Intellectual 
Property System in China, 1 WIPO J. 117, 120 (2009); see also PANG LAIKWAN, CREATIVITY 
AND ITS DISCONTENTS: CHINA’S CREATIVE INDUSTRIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
OFFENSES 8 (2012) (“If gaige kaifang (reform and open) was the dominant policy principle of the 
PRC government in the 1980s and 1990s, the recent Hu Jintao government has shifted its 
attention to gaige chuangxin (reform and innovation), emphasizing the importance of innovation 
and production of the new.” (Chinese characters omitted)); Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra 
note 1, at 189–96 (discussing the need to convince Chinese leaders of the benefits of intellectual 
property protection). 
 49 SIPO, China’s Intellectual Property Protection in 2008, http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/ 
whitepapers/200904/t20090427_457167.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2012). 
 50 See PRUD’HOMME, supra note 14, at 75–115 (discussing some of these initiatives). For 
discussions of China’s indigenous innovation policy, see generally An Siyuan & Brian Peck, 
China’s Indigenous Innovation Policy in the Context of Its WTO Obligations and Commitments, 
42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 375 (2011); Daniel Chow, China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies and the 
World Trade Organization, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2013); Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement 
Dispute, supra note 4, at 1122–24. 
 51 STATE COUNCIL, THE OUTLINE OF THE NATIONAL MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM PLAN FOR 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT (2006–2020) § II(1) (2006) [hereinafter NATIONAL 
MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM PLAN], available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-
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declared the State Council’s commitment to turn China into an 
innovation-based economy by 2020. As the Plan defined, “[i]ndigenous 
[or independent] innovation refers to enhancing original innovation, 
integrated innovation, and re-innovation based on assimilation and 
absorption of imported technology, in order improve our national 
innovation capability.”52 
Although the goals behind policies introduced to promote 
independent innovation have been vague and unclear at times, they 
quickly attracted criticisms from U.S. rights holders and their supportive 
government.53 As the USTR noted in the 2010 National Trade Estimate 
Report on Foreign Trade Barriers: 
A troubling trend that has emerged . . . is China’s willingness to 
encourage domestic or “indigenous” innovation at the cost of foreign 
innovation and technologies. For example, . . . in November 2009, 
China issued the Circular on Launching the 2009 National 
Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Work with the aim of 
improving “indigenous” innovation in computer and other 
technology equipment. In order to qualify as “indigenous” 
innovation under the accreditation system, and therefore be entitled 
to procurement preferences, a product’s intellectual property must 
originally be registered in China.54 
Notwithstanding the concerns registered by U.S. rights holders and 
their supportive government, indigenous innovation policies have both 
benefits and drawbacks. As I testified before the ITC in June 2010, such 
policies can be beneficial when they help encourage the development of 
local stakeholders.55 For more than a decade, industries and 
 
02/09/content_183787.htm and translated at http://www.etiea.cn/data/attachment/ 
123%286%29.pdf. For discussions of this fifteen-year plan, see generally Cao Cong, Richard P. 
Suttmeier & Denis Fred Simon, China’s 15-year Science and Technology Plan, PHYSICS TODAY, 
Dec. 2006, at 38; Feng Xiaoqing, The Interaction Between Enhancing the Capacity for 
Independent Innovation and Patent Protection: A Perspective on the Third Amendment to the 
Patent Law of the P.R. China, 9 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, ¶ 7 (2008); Liang, supra note 17, at 
483–84. The other three principles are “leapfrogging in priority fields, enabling development, and 
leading the future.” NATIONAL MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM PLAN, supra, § II(1). 
 52 NATIONAL MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM PLAN, supra note 51, § II(1). 
 53 For criticisms of China’s independent innovation policies, see generally ROBERT D. 
ATKINSON, ENOUGH IS ENOUGH: CONFRONTING CHINESE INNOVATION MERCANTILISM (2012), 
available at http://www2.itif.org/2012-enough-enough-chinese-mercantilism.pdf; JAMES 
MCGREGOR, CHINA’S DRIVE FOR “INDIGENOUS INNOVATION” A WEB OF INDUSTRIAL POLICIES 
(2010), available at http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/ 
100728chinareport_0.pdf. See also Assessing China’s Efforts to Become an “Innovation 
Society”—A Progress Report: Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. & Security Review Comm’n, 
112th Cong. (2012), available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2012hearings/ 
written_testimonies/hr12_05_10.php [hereinafter USCC Hearing]. 
 54 U.S. TRADE REP., 2010 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE 
BARRIERS 69 (2010). 
 55 See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, INV. NO. 322-514, USITC PUB. NO. 4199, CHINA: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT, INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES, AND 
FRAMEWORKS FOR MEASURING THE EFFECTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY, at D-20 (2010), available 
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commentators, myself included, have argued for the need to develop a 
critical mass of local stakeholders to help push for stronger intellectual 
property protection from the inside.56 It is therefore highly encouraging 
that many Chinese leaders and nationals now finally realize the 
importance and benefits of indigenous innovation. The more local 
innovation there is, the more likely Chinese policymakers and the public 
at large will support greater intellectual property reforms in the future. 
Nevertheless, indigenous innovation policies can be harmful if they 
discriminate against foreign firms. Such discriminatory policies easily 
bring to mind bad experiences foreign policymakers and industries 
encountered in the past. These experiences included the self-reliance 
and import substitution policies practiced during the Mao era57 and the 
dreaded Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue introduced 
in the mid-1990s. As noted China scholar Stanley Lubman recounted: 
In June 1995, the State Planning Commission issued investment 
guidelines in a “Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue” 
that classified projects as “encouraged,” “permitted,” “restricted” and 
“discouraged.” (Other internal guidelines also existed, which limited 
the market share that foreign firms could have in certain industries.) 
Then, in January, 1998, new guidelines were issued. The category of 
“encouraged” investments displayed a heightened emphasis on 
advanced technology; some types of projects now faced the 
additional requirement of high output capacities; others were moved 
to the “restricted” category, while controls were increased in some 
areas were already in that category. Subsequent revisions of the 
Catalogue have seemed to reflect movement in China’s national 
policy toward FDI and selective encouragement, rather than 
emphasizing tight control over foreign presences in the economy. 
This suggests that investors whose projects fall within the 
“encouraged” or “permitted” categories ought to find the approval 
process fairly routine, while those who wish to apply for investments 
 
at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4199.pdf (summarizing the Author’s testimony). 
 56 See, e.g., AM. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE—CHINA, AMERICAN BUSINESS IN CHINA 42 
(2006), available at http://www.amcham-china.org.cn/amcham/upload/wysiwyg/ 
20060516094503.pdf (recommending that the “successful realization of [China’s] innovation 
priorities is the upside inducement for the Chinese to implement the fundamental reforms 
necessary to guarantee protection of IPR”); Intellectual Property Rights Issues and Imported 
Counterfeit Goods: Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. and Security Comm’n, 109th Cong. 257 
(2006) (statement of Timothy Trainer, President, Global Intellectual Property Strategy Center) 
(noting the need “to address the true local interested parties, the local entrepreneurs and how they 
can be commercially and economically empowered to benefit from IP”); Peter K. Yu, The 
Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 431–33 (2003) (discussing the need to create local 
stakeholders in the intellectual property system); Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 1, at 
958–59 (providing an example to illustrate the benefits of developing local stakeholders in the 
intellectual property system). 
 57 See Cao et al., supra note 51, at 40 (“In its ambiguity[,] zizhu chuangxin . . . has been 
construed by some as a regression to the self-defeating techno-nationalist notions of self-reliance 
(zili gengsheng) from the Maoist period, during which Chinese research and innovation were 
largely cut off from the international community and consequently were significantly retarded.”). 
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in the “restricted” category will encounter greater difficulty. More 
recent adjustments, however, have also closed some areas or shifted 
them out of the “encouraged” category.58 
Thus, when these disturbing past experiences were taken into 
consideration, and when indigenous innovation policies were linked to 
the large and fast-growing Chinese government procurement market,59 
U.S. policymakers and industries understandably feared the deleterious 
effects of these new policies.60 Ultimately, whether the policies are good 
or bad will depend on how they are structured—for example, whether 
they discriminate against foreign firms. If the policies are 
discriminatory, they not only will endanger foreign industries, but will 
also threaten to violate China’s commitments under the WTO or other 
international agreements.61 
To be certain, most foreign industries, policymakers, and 
commentators would hope that local policymakers in China could 
develop a right mix of policies that promote only good indigenous 
innovation. In reality, however, it is very rare for policymakers to get 
their policies completely right from the get-go without any trial and 
error. This is particularly true when policymakers are only beginning to 
understand the importance and benefits of indigenous innovation—for 
example, what it means to have indigenous innovation and how they 
can bring forth more of such innovation? 
Thus, foreign policymakers and industries should avoid having 
knee-jerk resistance to China’s indigenous innovation policies—even 
when flaws emerge. It is also important to carefully separate good 
indigenous innovation policies that do not benefit foreign firms from 
bad indigenous innovation policies that intentionally discriminate 
against those firms. After all, from the standpoint of intellectual 
property reform, it is urgent that Chinese leaders and the public at large 
better understand the importance and benefits of indigenous innovation. 
Such understanding is likely to provide long-term benefits for foreign 
firms and intellectual property rights holders. 
While the adoption of indigenous innovation policies has already 
sparked many interesting, and at times intense, debates, the emphasis on 
“zizhu zhishi chanquan” in the State Council’s National Intellectual 
 
 58 Stanley Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 19 (2006) (footnote 
omitted). 
 59 See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Fact Sheet: 23rd U.S.-China Joint Commission on 
Commerce and Trade, available at http://www.commerce.gov/news/fact-sheets/2012/12/19/fact-
sheet-23rd-us-china-joint-commission-commerce-and-trade (last updated Dec. 19, 2012) (“China 
reported that in 2011 government procurement was $179 billion. . . . China’s government 
procurement has been growing at 25 percent per year over the past seven years.”). 
 60 See An & Peck, supra note 50, at 442 (“The primary reason why China’s indigenous 
innovation measures are drawing so much attention is basically an economic one—China’s 
government procurement market is one of the largest in the world, and the indigenous innovation 
measures may result in restricting or even closing this market to foreign companies.”). 
 61 See Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, supra note 4, at 1123. 
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Property Strategy has raised a different set of questions.62 To begin 
with, the term “zizhu zhishi chanquan” does not directly translate to 
“indigenous intellectual property.” In fact, finding the right translation 
for this term has been particularly challenging; such a task is 
challenging for not only foreign policymakers and industry 
representatives, but also seasoned analysts who have closely followed 
China’s intellectual property developments—domestic and foreign 
alike. 
As with many other Chinese terms, the term “zizhu zhishi 
chanquan” does not translate well from Chinese to English. While “zhi” 
can be easily translated to “self,” “zhu” is much more complicated. As a 
noun, the word refers to “master,” “owner,” or “host.” As a verb, the 
word refers to “direct” or “manage.” As an adjective, the word refers to 
“chief” or “main.” Thus, policymakers, commentators, and the media 
have translated “zizhu” to “self-relied,” “self-driven,” “self-controlled,” 
“self-owned,” “indigenous,” “homegrown,” or “independent.”63 Out of 
all the terms, the word “independent” seems to best capture the term’s 
original meaning while preserving its useful Western connotations. 
In his highly critical report on the Chinese patent system, Dan 
Prud’homme traced the origin of the term “zizhu zhishi chanquan” to 
the automotive policies in the mid-1990s: 
Consultations suggest that the term originated in the mid-1990s 
[when] it was used in policy advice to build domestic IPR in the 
Chinese automobile industry. At the turn of the new millennium, the 
term was used in important policy guidance, which is still in effect, 
from state leader Jiang Zemin at an April 2nd 2000 conference on the 
Exhibition on China’s Fifteen-Year Achievements in Patent Work. 
There is solid evidence . . . that the term typically means IP 
ownership, including acquired ownership, by a Chinese entity, which 
in some cases expressly is said to exclude entities with a majority 
foreign ownership.64 
When this origin is taken into account, the term “zizhu” intellectual 
property certainly covers more than “indigenous” or “homegrown” 
intellectual property. Although the term “independent intellectual 
property” does not provide a direct translation, it accurately reflects that 
“zizhu” intellectual property can be developed or acquired from abroad 
or involve China-based entities with minority foreign ownership.65 The 
key to identifying certain intellectual property as “zizhu” is whether 
 
 62 See NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY, supra note 43, ¶ 7. 
 63 See, e.g., id.; PRUD’HOMME, supra note 14, at 79; Wu, supra note 48, at 121; Yu, Middle 
Kingdom, supra note 1, at 247. 
 64 PRUD’HOMME, supra note 14, at 79 (footnotes omitted). 
 65 See id. at 82 (“[C]onsultations with two Chinese lawyers and an ex-government official 
based in China . . . confirm the term in practice is meant to refer to IPR on core technology owned 
by a Chinese entity that in no way is reliant on a foreign entity/influence.”). 
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such an asset is independently controlled by Chinese individuals, firms, 
or the government. Understanding such a key feature not only helps us 
better appreciate the goals behind the State Council’s National 
Intellectual Property Strategy, but also raises important questions about 
whether the present discussion about China’s indigenous innovation 
policies has been under-inclusive and somewhat wrong-headed. 
Moreover, if achieving economic and technological independence 
is a key goal behind the State Council’s adoption of the National 
Intellectual Property Strategy,66 one cannot ignore the link of this key 
goal to the developing countries’ ongoing frustration with the existing 
international intellectual property regime. Since the adoption of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS Agreement),67 these countries repeatedly registered their 
concerns and disappointments over the inappropriately high standards 
of protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights.68 In the 
past decade, these concerns and disappointments were further 
exacerbated by the developed countries’ active push for the 
establishment of bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade, investment, 
and intellectual property agreements.69 
To be certain, China’s interests are somewhat different from those 
of many developing countries. Technically, China is what I have 
 
 66 As the State Council declared in the National Intellectual Property Strategy, “Implementing 
the national intellectual property strategy to greatly promote China’s capacity in creation, 
utilization, protection and administration of intellectual property will help improve China’s 
capacity for independent innovation and aid in efforts to make China an innovative country.” 
NATIONAL MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM PLAN, supra note 51, § II(1). In the context of 
“independent innovation,” the State Council further stated in the National Medium- and Long-
Term Plan: 
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improvement of indigenous innovation capability must be made a national strategy that 
is implemented in all sectors, industries, and regions so as to drastically enhance the 
nation’s competitiveness. 
Id.  
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described as a “middle intellectual property power”; it possesses a large 
and fast-growing aggregate economy and high technological and 
innovative capabilities.70 As a result, it does obtain benefits from the 
existing international intellectual property system despite its continuous 
criticism of that system. Nevertheless, China still aligns more closely 
with the developing world than with the developed world, due in large 
part to the country’s continuous struggle with internal problems, uneven 
regional, sectoral, and technological developments, limited resources on 
a per capita basis, and other reasons unrelated to intellectual property 
protection and enforcement (such as the importance of retaining 
leadership in the developing world).71 In fact, China remains reluctant to 
increase intellectual property protection for pharmaceuticals, chemicals, 
fertilizers, seeds, and foodstuffs, notwithstanding its already fast-
growing industries in entertainment, software, semiconductors, and 
selected areas of biotechnology.72 
In sum, it remains unclear what international intellectual property 
system China will ultimately prefer. If the Chinese patent system 
continues to develop, there is a very good chance that China may prefer 
a system that better aligns with its historical traditions, cultural 
backgrounds, socio-economic conditions, ideological values, and policy 
preferences. As I observed in the inaugural issue of The WIPO Journal: 
Although intellectual property protections in [emerging countries 
such as Brazil, China, and India] will no doubt improve in the near 
future, there is no guarantee that these countries will be interested in 
retaining the existing intellectual property system once they cross 
over to the other side of the intellectual property divide. Instead, 
these “new champions” may want to develop something different—
something that builds upon their historical traditions and cultural 
backgrounds and that takes account of their drastically different 
socio-economic conditions.73 
Thus, how China develops its independent innovation polices, or 
independent intellectual property, is likely to have a significant impact 
on the future development of the international intellectual property 
system. 
 
 70 See generally Peter K. Yu, The Middle Intellectual Property Powers, in LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES (Tom Ginsburg & Randall Peerenboom eds., 
forthcoming 2013) (discussing the emergence of “middle intellectual property powers”). 
 71 See Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property 
Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 21–32 [hereinafter Yu, Regime Complex]; Yu, Middle 
Kingdom, supra note 1, at 229–30, 234. 
 72 See Yu, Regime Complex, supra note 71, at 25–26. 
 73 Peter K. Yu, The Global Intellectual Property Order and Its Undetermined Future, 1 
WIPO J. 1, 13 (2009) [hereinafter Yu, Global Intellectual Property Order]. 
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III.     QUESTION 3: IS THERE A GRAND STRATEGY BEHIND CHINA’S  
RECENT PUSH FOR PATENT DEVELOPMENTS? 
When one closely studies the State Council’s National Intellectual 
Property Strategy, SIPO’s National Patent Development Strategy, and 
other plans and measures introduced at the national, provincial, and 
municipal levels to implement these strategies, it is not hard to notice 
the careful planning and strategizing behind the Chinese government’s 
effort. Equally blatant is China’s eagerness to catch up with other 
developed countries—both economically and technologically. If one is 
willing to go beyond the intellectual property area, one could even 
include the State Council’s National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for 
Science and Technology Development, which laid out China’s current 
science and technology policy and sought to turn China into an 
innovation-based economy by 2020. 
Taken together, these various strategies, plans, and measures may 
suggest China’s success in devising a grand strategy to play economic 
and technological catch-up with developed countries. As Ikechi 
Mgbeoji noted in an interview with the Financial Post: 
I’m amused when I listen to people who speak in a patronizing 
manner about China, as if the Chinese did not know what they’re 
doing and suddenly they have now seen the light and have embraced 
the international patent system and so forth. . . . No, this was a 
deliberate policy of the Chinese state. It was a calculated and well 
planned thing. It wasn’t as though they didn’t understand the value of 
patents. . . . It was because they understood if they had very strong 
patent system at that stage in their development there will only be 
payment to foreign patent owners. So what they did was have a 
regime in place where they were free to copy, to steal ideas from 
other countries.74 
Professor Mgbeoji’s assessment was both correct and incorrect. He 
was correct in pointing out that China has maintained a sustained effort 
to build up capacity to catch up with developed economies. Since the 
Deng Xiaoping–led second-generation leadership reopened the 
domestic market to foreign trade, catching up has been a major goal 
behind China’s national policies.75 Such catching-up was indeed 
necessary in the wake of the country’s ill-advised import substitution 
policies (which made the country technologically backward) and the 
Cultural Revolution (which cost the country a decade of productivity, 
 
 74 Jameson Berkow, Patent Dragon Awakes, FIN. POST, Nov. 7, 2011, 
http://business.financialpost.com/2011/11/07/patent-dragon-awakes/ (quoting Ikechi Mgbeoji, 
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University). 
 75 See Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to 
Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L. L.J. 1, 27–28 (2001) 
[hereinafter Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives]. 
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training, and technological development).76 
In a forthcoming book chapter, I described how China built a 
patent ladder step-by-step in its effort to play economic and 
technological catch-up with developed countries.77 To a large extent, 
China’s experience illustrates well how the development of a well-
functioning patent system can serve as an essential tool to foster 
economic development and technological proficiency. That experience 
is also not that different from the policies practiced by other once-
developing countries. As William Kingston reminded us: “From the 
start of the industrial revolution, every country that became 
economically great began by copying: the Germans copied the British; 
the Americans copied the British and the Germans, and the Japanese 
copied everybody.”78 History is indeed filled with stories about how 
countries have successfully “crossed over” from the developing, 
copycat stage to the developed, innovative stage.79 Interestingly, for our 
purposes, no country has ever become economically developed without 
also gaining more respect for intellectual property rights. Thus, if 
China’s developments indeed follow this well-treaded path, in the near 
future it likely will join other once-developing countries in crossing 
over from a pirating nation to an intellectual property–respecting 
nation.80 
Nevertheless, Professor Mgbeoji was incorrect in overstating the 
grand strategy Chinese leaders were able to devise. Having a national 
goal of catching up with developed economies is very different from 
 
 76 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra note 1, at 198; Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and 
Perspectives, supra note 75, at 21–22. 
 77 See Yu, Building the Ladder, supra note 47. 
 78 William Kingston, An Agenda for Radical Intellectual Property Reform, in 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 653, 658 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 
2005). 
 79 See Yu, Rise and Decline, supra note 6, at 533–43 (discussing the United States’ crossover 
experience). 
 80 See Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 1, at 175 (“[H]istory suggests that China is now simply 
following the economic development paths of Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan—or even Germany and the United States. It is only a matter of time before China is 
converted from a pirating nation to a country that respects intellectual property rights.”). Noted 
China scholar Kenneth Lieberthal concurred: 
Every current advanced industrial economy went through a phase of development 
characterized by widespread theft of intellectual property. But over time in each such 
economy some domestic players developed their own intellectual property and became 
sufficiently powerful in the political system that they moved the system toward more 
effective IP protection. The question is whether a similar process is unfolding in China 
and whether it may take hold as Chinese producers move up the technology innovation 
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There are clear indicators that China’s evolution is following the IP paths that 
others have trod. 
KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, MANAGING THE CHINA CHALLENGE: HOW TO ACHIEVE CORPORATE 
SUCCESS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 26–27 (2011). 
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having an intellectual property strategy that seeks to steal other 
intellectual property first before the country becomes developed enough 
to offer strong protection and to demand the same from its weaker 
trading partners.81 While a grand strategy—or, worse, a conspiracy 
theory—may be attractive to those who are frustrated by the slow 
progress China is making in enforcing intellectual property rights, that 
theory assumes too much of a developing country’s ability—or, to be 
more accurate, the human ability—to strike the appropriate balance in 
the intellectual property system.82 It is not easy for countries to 
determine ex ante when they have to cross over from the pirating side of 
the intellectual property divide to the more promising side. Even in 
hindsight, it is rather hard to determine when a once-pirating nation 
such as the United States, Japan, South Korea, or Singapore transformed 
into a country respectful of intellectual property rights. 
If anything, the evolution of the Chinese patent system has 
revealed the need for policymakers to take an incremental, pragmatic 
approach toward establishing a well-functioning patent system. Such 
development strongly resembles China’s developments in non–
intellectual property areas. The defining feature of the Chinese model—
or what some commentators have described as the “Beijing 
Consensus”83 or, more modestly, the “Beijing Proposal”84—is not a 
definitive formula of success. Rather, it is the Chinese leaders’ 
pragmatic approach in “groping for stones to cross the river”85 (mozhe 
shitou guohe) and their willingness to consider a wide variety of 
options.86 As Deng Xiaoping reminded Ghana President Jerry Rawlings 
 
 81 Cf. Berkow, supra note 74 (“China, experts argue, has intentionally maintained a lax 
intellectual property enforcement regime for decades, waiting until its internal invention industry 
had become strong enough to warrant something more robust.”). 
 82 Dan Breznitz made a similar observation in his testimony before the U.S.-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission: 
I’m not sure that China as a state has this grand strategy where they actually 
understand everything that they’re doing because the failures of the central government 
are unbelievable. But they have—(a) they have goals; (b) they have the will and the 
power to go and do something about those goals. They have extremely capable 
officials in the provincial and townships, which are doing everything in their power to 
make this system work, sometimes against the wishes of the central government, and 
we don’t have that much. 
USCC Hearing, supra note 53, at 42. 
 83  See generally JOSHUA COOPER RAMO, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS 4 (2004) (advancing the 
concept of the Beijing Consensus); STEFAN A. HALPER, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS: HOW CHINA’S 
AUTHORITARIAN MODEL WILL DOMINATE THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2010) (discussing the 
Beijing Consensus). 
 84 HU ANGANG, CHINA IN 2020: A NEW TYPE OF SUPERPOWER 17 (2011). 
 85 Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 69, at 1006. 
 86 See WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, ASIA, AMERICA, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
GEOPOLITICS 118 (2007) (“Chinese leaders . . . do not accept Western democratic ideology, but 
they accept individual practices, such as village elections, because those practices have specific 
pragmatic value in reducing corruption. They want to discover and test these things themselves, 
step by step, rather than succumb to foreign ideological browbeating, but they are willing to 
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in 1985: “Please don’t try to copy our model. If there is any experience 
on our part, it is to formulate policies in light of one’s own national 
conditions.”87 In the context of China’s increasing engagement in 
Africa, Deborah Brautigam also observed: 
At the end of the day, we should remember this: China’s own 
experiments have raised hundreds of millions of Chinese out of 
poverty, largely without foreign aid. They believe in investment, 
trade, and technology as levers for development, and they are 
applying these same tools in their African engagement, not out of 
altruism but because of what they learned at home. . . . These lessons 
emphasize not aid, but experiments; not paternalism, but the 
“creative destruction” of competition and the green shoots of new 
opportunities.88 
In sum, while policymakers could certainly draw lessons and 
insights from the slow, but active development of the Chinese patent 
system, including the many “experiments” China conducted in the past 
three decades to turn the system around, such development does not 
provide a “grand strategy” or an easy prescription for other countries to 
catch up in the patent world. In fact, China’s development was filled 
with stories of trials and tribulations, of both successes and failures. 
These failures, along with the country’s rapidly-changing socio-
economic conditions, were indeed why China had to completely revamp 
its patent system three times since the system was introduced in 1984.89 
To a large extent, China’s patent story is a story about “learning by 
legislating”—a story familiar to most developing countries. 
Until recently, the Chinese intellectual property model has been 
rather unappealing, due in large part to the rampant piracy and 
counterfeiting problems within the country. In recent years, however, 
the country’s success in developing a world-class patent system has 
invited developing countries to take a much-needed second look. To 
some extent, the present discussion about the Chinese patent system has 
raised the same question found in other recent debates concerning 
China’s role in the international policy arena: Does Beijing now provide 
an attractive alternative model for other developing countries that are 
struggling in the present international economic system to catch up 
 
consider nearly everything.” (emphasis added)). 
 87 JUSTIN YIFU LIN, THE QUEST FOR PROSPERITY: HOW DEVELOPING ECONOMIES CAN 
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 88 DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, THE DRAGON’S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA 
311–12 (2010); see also Sebastian Heilmann, Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise, 
43 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 1 (2008) (discussing experimentation-based policymaking in China). 
 89 Since the introduction of a modern patent law in 1984, China undertook a major overhaul 
of the patent system in 1992, 2000, and 2008. See Yu, Building the Ladder, supra note 47. 
Although the system was revamped every eight years, “[t]hat each amendment should come every 
eight years is a total coincidence.” Guo He, Patents, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
TECHNOLOGY LAWS 25, 29–30 (Rohan Kariyawasam ed., 2011). 
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economically and technologically?90 
IV.     QUESTION 4: HAVE CHINESE SCHOOLS STARTED PLACING  
MORE EMPHASIS ON CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION? 
In view of the recent developments concerning the Chinese patent 
system, one may begin to wonder what the major contributing factors 
are. After all, developments concerning innovation strongly parallel 
those concerning creativity. As Michael Keane observed in Created in 
China in the mid-2000s: 
While scarcely a defining concern for most Western researchers and 
journalists, creativity has become a hot topic on the Mainland. 
Concepts such as creative nation, creative city and creative century 
are endorsed in policy statements within the 11th Five Year Plans of 
many Chinese cities. How did “creativity” come to China so 
suddenly? Why has it been embraced so enthusiastically?91 
One question that I have often been asked in conferences or 
presentations concerns whether Chinese schools have now started to 
place more emphasis on creativity and innovation.92 This line of 
questioning is understandable for two reasons. First, and obviously, 
creativity and innovation go hand in hand with intellectual property 
developments. If Chinese inventors, all of a sudden, have been able to 
file many more patents, and if these filings were in fact not distorted by 
domestic policy adjustments (as some critics of the Chinese patent 
system have claimed),93 it is fair to assume that China has started to 
provide either a more innovative environment or a much larger pool of 
creative and engineering talents. Because education is instrumental to 
cultivating such an environment or developing these needed talents, 
schools provide a logical starting point for any inquiry concerning 
China’s recent intellectual property developments.94 
 
 90 See Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 69, at 1018–22 (exploring whether China 
would present an alternative model of economic development for other developing countries); see 
also RAMO, supra note 83, at 3 (“China is marking a path for other nations around the world who 
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international order in a way that allows them to be truly independent, to protect their way of life 
and political choices in a world with a single massively powerful centre of gravity.”). 
 91 MICHAEL KEANE, CREATED IN CHINA: THE GREAT NEW LEAP FORWARD 2 (2007). 
 92 For example, my fellow panelists and I were asked this particular question at the 
Conference on “China’s New Environment for Intellectual Property” at Fordham University 
School of Law on April 11, 2012. 
 93 See discussion supra Part I. 
 94 Cf. Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign 
Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 109, 143 (1998) 
(“[B]ecause labor skills are required for absorbing, using, and improving incoming 
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Second, the Chinese educational system—or what some 
commentators have derogatory described as “stuffed duck-style 
education”95—has been widely criticized for its notorious emphasis on 
rote learning and memorization and discouragement of creativity and 
innovation.96 Indeed, commentators have identified China’s educational 
and cultural environments as contributing factors to the country’s lack 
of creativity or of respect for intellectual property rights.97 Some 
commentators even blamed Confucianism, or the larger Chinese culture, 
for the country’s massive piracy and counterfeiting problems.98 Thus, if 
China has turned its patent system around, it might have found new 
ways to encourage the development of a more creative and innovative 
citizenry. 
While the discussion of creativity and innovation in education is 
very important, and rote learning remains a heavily criticized aspect of 
 
the important role education plays in promoting global competitiveness). 
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nothing. When fresh graduates enter the workforce, their lips are sealed and their 
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DOCTOROFF, supra note 30, at 20–21. Likewise, Mark Liang noted: 
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Chinese education,99 it is a non-starter to consider the Chinese 
uncreative and uninnovative. It is indeed hard to imagine how an 
uncreative and uninnovative people could come up with such pioneering 
innovations as compass, gunpowder, papermaking, and woodblock 
printing.100 In his seminal book series, Science and Civilisation in 
China, Joseph Needham devoted his lifelong work to studying Chinese 
scientific developments, including many inventions that still benefit the 
world today.101 The important question China scholars ask is therefore 
not why the Chinese could not come up with world-class inventions, but 
why China had stopped doing so after a certain period of time?102 
Put in the intellectual property context, that question becomes: 
Why did China not offer stronger protection of intellectual property 
rights despite having led the world in innovation? Raising that question 
was indeed the approach taken by William Alford in his seminal work, 
To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense.103 In the book’s opening 
paragraph, he wrote: “Although scholars both East and West credit the 
Chinese with having contributed paper, movable type, and ink to 
humankind, China has yet to develop comprehensive protection for 
what is created when one applies inked type to paper.”104 
Even today, it is not hard to find traces of creativity and innovation 
in products that most would condemn as infringing under international 
intellectual property standards. Examples of these products included 
unauthorized spinoffs of Harry Potter novels,105 funny copycat logos 
such as “KFG,” “OMcMcDonald’s,” and “Pizza Huh,” and “shanzhai” 
smartphones that improved on the original products.106 In all of these 
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examples of copycat products, what is problematic is not the lack of 
creativity and innovation in these products. Rather, it is the violation of 
intellectual property rights—or, in ethical terms, their engagement in 
unfair business or trade practices. 
Thus, a critical question that one should ask more frequently is: Do 
the current international intellectual property standards provide 
appropriate proxies for measuring creativity and innovation? In the 
context of China’s recent developments in the patent area, it is also 
worth exploring whether the type of creativity and innovation China 
possesses is the same as the type enshrined in the current international 
standards. Just because a product fails to satisfy the novelty, 
nonobviousness, and utility requirements pursuant to the existing patent 
standards does not necessarily mean that the product lacks any 
creativity and innovativeness. It only means that the product does not 
meet the strict threshold requirements set by these usually geopolitically 
influenced standards. 
In the past few years, commentators documented the emergence of 
creative and innovative talents within China. For example, Michael 
Keane identified such creative clusters as “Beijing’s 798 Factory, 
Hangzhou’s Loft 49, Shanghai’s Tianzifang, and Chongqing’s Tank 
Loft.”107 With regard to the semiconductor chip industry, Edward Luce 
of the Financial Times also observed, “Terms such as ‘innovate in 
China’ . . . are becoming commonplace at Intel and elsewhere.”108 In 
fact, since the mid-1990s, Intel “has built five plants in China, all using 
the latest technologies. To tap into China’s distinctive technological 
developments, Intel Capital has invested in almost fifty companies in 
China and in 2005 it set up a $200 million Intel Capital China 
Technology Fund to take shares in promising technologies emerging 
there.”109 Motorola and LG have also made similar investments, 
building research and development (R&D) centers in China.110 
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In addition, a growing number of commentators have started to 
appreciate the different forms of innovation that are slowly emerging in 
China. For instance, Zeng Ming and Peter Williamson discussed what 
they called “cost innovation.”111 As they observed: 
The new competition from China is . . . disruptive because it 
threatens to obsolete much of the established firms’ assets, 
capabilities, and experience base by changing the accepted rules of 
the game, undermining traditional profit models, and growing parts 
of the market that incumbents are poorly equipped to serve.112 
By contrast, Tan Yinglan focused on “process innovation.”113 As he 
explained: 
Most of China’s companies are in the stage of process innovation. 
Start-ups typically learn and adopt business models from other 
geographies and adapt them locally. Companies are trying to move 
into technological innovation via research and development by 
building on their existing knowledge, the way semiconductor firms 
are moving into thin film in 2010. Most Chinese firms are still using 
existing technology to create products, rather than creating the 
technology itself (as is done in the United States).114 
Going further than Tan, Dan Breznitz and Michael Murphree pointed 
out that “China’s innovation capabilities are not solely in process (or 
incremental) innovation but also in the organization of production, 
manufacturing techniques and technologies, delivery, design, and 
second-generation innovation.”115 
The emergence of this literature is important. Such literature not 
only helps us better understand how the Chinese patent system will be 
developed in the near future, but also raises the important, and 
somewhat sensitive, question about whether China’s emergence as a 
patent power would harm the interests of other major developed 
countries, including most notably the United States. In Run of the Red 
Queen, for example, Breznitz and Murphree reminded us that the 
Chinese model could complement the breakthrough innovation 
embraced by the United States and other developed countries.116 Using 
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Apple iPod and iPhone as examples, the authors observed: 
China needed Apple to develop the concept and definition of the 
iPod and the iPhone, but Apple cannot produce and sell these 
products without China. In the world of flexible mass production, the 
Red Queen country [referring to China or other countries with a 
similar innovation model] needs the novel-product innovators to 
keep churning out new ideas, and the novel-product-innovating 
countries need the Red Queen country to keep innovating on almost 
every aspect of production and delivery.117 
Likewise, Zeng Ming and Peter Williamson wrote: “Far from being a 
zero-sum game . . . , the emergence of Chinese companies as significant 
players in the global market promises new benefits to the world’s 
consumers and new opportunities to those established companies that 
choose the right responses and execute them well.”118 Tan Yinglan 
further noted that the use by most Chinese firms of “existing technology 
to create products, rather than creating the technology itself[,] . . . makes 
China tech markets symbiotic and complementary with the U.S. market 
and those in some other countries.”119 
In sum, if the type of innovation found in China is indeed 
somewhat different from the type commonly found in the United States 
or other parts of the world, one has to wonder whether it is 
oversimplified to inquire whether Chinese schools are now beginning to 
place more emphasis on creativity and innovation. While this line of 
questioning certainly ties well to an intellectual property–irrelevant 
debate about political freedom and democracy, it informs less about 
China’s future as a patent power. After all, there are different types of 
creativity and innovation.120 If we want to know more about whether 
schools have placed more emphasis on creativity and innovation, we 
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INNOVATION, supra, at 349–484 (collecting essays discussing variations in innovation processes). 
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also need to develop a better appreciation of the different types of 
creativity and innovation found across the world. Which type are we 
talking about: pathbreaking or breakthrough innovation or sequential or 
cumulative innovation?121 “First-to-world innovation,”122 “business 
model innovation,” or “innovations in supply chain management”?123 
V.     QUESTION 5: WILL THE PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IMPROVE IN CHINA  
IN THE NEAR FUTURE? 
The recent significant increase in the number of patents applied for 
and granted in China may lead one to wonder whether the intellectual 
property landscape in China has undergone or will undergo a tectonic 
shift. Drawing on the history of intellectual property developments in 
Germany, the United States, Japan, and many other once-developing 
countries, one may also question whether China has finally reached that 
proverbial “crossover point”—the point where a country crosses over 
from a pirating nation to a nation respectful of intellectual property 
rights.124 After all, the picture concerning China’s recent developments 
in the patent area is certainly different from the clichéd picture of pirates 
and counterfeiters policymakers, industries, commentators, and the 
media have painted painstakingly for more than a decade. 
To be certain, the improvements found in China in the patent area 
are not isolated. One could also find similar developments in the 
trademark area. In a previous work, I noted how trademark protection 
fits well with the socio-political environment in China.125 For example, 
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 125 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 1, at 995–98. 
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when compared with copyrights or patents, trademarks will create fewer 
obstacles to China’s modernization efforts. As Peter Feng rightly 
observed, trademarks “were a state planning tool before they became a 
marketing device and private property.”126 By contrast, copyright 
protection could negatively impact a country’s ability to maintain 
cultural and media control and its extensive propaganda efforts.127 
Patent protection could also slow down a country’s efforts by draining 
foreign exchange reserves in the form of royalty and license fee 
payments. 
It is therefore no surprise that the 1982 Trademark Law was the 
first intellectual property law to be enacted after China reopened its 
market to foreign trade in the late 1970s. (For comparison purposes, the 
Patent Law was not introduced until two years later, and the Copyright 
Law was adopted in 1990 following significant pressure from the 
USTR.128) It is also worth noting that trademark registrations continued 
even during the Cultural Revolution, despite growing politicization of 
trademarks and the growing use among manufacturers of “politically 
correct” pseudonyms and non-identifying labels (such as “Red Flag” 
(hongqi), “East Wind” (dongfeng), and “Worker-Peasant-Soldier” (gong 
nong bing)).129 In fact, had China not actively pushed for the 
development of the patent system through the State Council’s National 
Intellectual Property Strategy and SIPO’s National Patent Development 
Strategy, one may wonder whether trademark protection would have a 
much brighter future in China than both copyright and patent 
protections. With the adoption of these strategies, however, it is likely 
that the future of both trademark and patent protection will be much 
brighter than that of copyright protection. 
If the compatibility between trademark protection and China’s 
socio-political environment is not significant enough, the development 
of the Chinese trademark system has benefited significantly from the 
government’s active push for the development of national champions 
and their well-known brands.130 The development of the trademark 
system also goes hand in hand with the rapid emergence of the Chinese 
middle class, whose disposable income and purchasing power have 
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helped facilitate the development of a fast-growing luxury market. As 
early as 2005, Ernst & Young made the following forecast: 
The Chinese luxury market . . . is expected to grow 20%, annually 
until 2008 and then 10% annually until 2015, when sales are 
expected to exceed US$ 11.5 billion. By 2010, China is expected to 
have a quarter-billion consumers who can afford luxury products, 
nearly 17 times the present number. By 2015, Chinese consumers 
could be as influential as the Japanese and account for 29% of all 
global luxury goods purchases.131 
Although this forecast was already quite impressive a few years ago, a 
new forecast showed that the Chinese middle class and luxury goods 
market had grown even more rapidly than many anticipated.132 As Bain 
& Company estimated in December 2011: 
Luxury goods purchases in China and by Chinese consumers reached 
a total of 212 B RMB [over US$30 billion] in 2010. Luxury 
purchases grew by 27 percent in Mainland China in 2010 and by 45 
percent in Hong Kong and Macau, while Chinese luxury purchases 
abroad grew by 38 percent. When including Hong Kong and Macau 
spending, Greater China becomes the world’s third largest luxury 
market, bypassing Italy and amounting to nearly 40% of the US 
luxury market.133 
In sum, intellectual property protection and enforcement is likely 
to greatly improve in both the patent and trademark areas. The same, 
however, may not be said of the copyright area. A major barrier to 
active development in this area is the continuously heavy control of 
content and information flows in both the offline and online worlds. In 
the audiovisual sector, for example, China continues to face significant 
content control.134 Such tight control eventually led the United States to 
file a WTO complaint concerning China’s denial of trading rights and 
market access for distribution services for publications, sound 
recordings, and audiovisual entertainment products.135 Despite an 
aggressive defense by China and a subsequent appeal, both the WTO 
panel and the Appellate Body found for the United States on most 
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counts.136 
Compared with the offline world, content control in the online 
environment in China is even more severe. Despite widely reported 
censorship in Russia, the Middle East, North Africa, and other parts of 
the world, China remains the poster child of internet censorship.137 
From time to time, mainstream media report the tightened censorship of 
internet-based media. Only a few months ago, mainstream media widely 
reported the new regulations the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress adopted to require the use of real identities in 
registering accounts with internet service providers.138 Although those 
regulations could promote the protection of personal data, critics feared 
that the new requirements would result in tighter control over the use of 
blogs and other internet-based social media.139 
In China in 2020, noted Chinese economist Hu Angang described 
five capacities and indicators that can be used to evaluate a country’s 
science and technology power.140 The first, second, and fifth capacities 
are directly related to the development of the patent system—namely, 
“the country’s innovative capacity in science” (measured by 
publications in internationally recognized science and technology 
journals), “innovative capacity as regards technology” (measured by 
domestic patent applications), and “the capacity of a country to invest in 
R&D” (measured by research and development expenditures).141 The 
third capacity, “the country’s ability to use new technologies” 
(measured by the number of computer users), relates to not only the 
patent system, but also other intellectual property systems, most notably 
copyright.142 
Although all four of these capacities are pretty straightforward and 
uncontroversial, the fourth capacity, “the capacity of a country to use 
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global information,” raises some challenging questions.143 In Professor 
Hu’s view, that capacity is “measured by calculating the number of 
people that access the Internet.”144 Because China now possesses the 
world’s largest internet population of more than 564 million,145 it likely 
possesses the needed capacity. On close scrutiny, however, a country 
cannot have full capacity to use global information unless access to the 
internet would result in meaningful access to the needed global 
information.146 Given the widespread control of internet content, one 
could question how successfully China meets this capacity. 
In sum, while China may experience very promising developments 
in the patent and trademark areas, its developments in the copyright area 
may lag significantly behind. Whether the protection and enforcement 
of intellectual property rights will improve will depend ultimately on 
whether one focuses on the first two areas or the last one. The 
impressive developments we see in the patent area likely will not 
translate well to similar progress in the copyright area. 
To complicate matters even further, the significant variations in 
these areas could raise an interesting question about what future foreign 
intellectual property policy the United States should adopt toward 
China. After all, a widening divide between patent and trademark 
protection on the one hand and copyright protection on the other could 
easily translate to a similar gap in the U.S.-China intellectual property 
debate—a gap between those U.S. industries driven by copyright 
protection (such as the movie and music industries) and those driven by 
patent and trademark protection (such as the pharmaceutical and luxury 
goods industries).147 
This widening gap is important, because external pressure—
usually from the USTR—has been a major catalyst to China’s 
intellectual property reforms. Such pressure comes in handy when 
reformist leaders need an outside push to help reduce resistance from 
their conservative counterparts.148 Thus, if the U.S.-China intellectual 
property debate is bifurcated along the lines of copyright versus patent 
and trademark, such bifurcation could result in significant variations in 
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the external pressure exerted on China in different areas of intellectual 
property law.149 These variations in turn would create further variations 
in the improvements in each area. 
Finally, while the divide between patent and trademark protection 
on the one hand and copyright protection on the other is significant, it is 
worth keeping in mind that China also struggles with wide regional, 
sectoral, and technological disparities.150 Indeed, these disparities are so 
significant that I have described China as “a country of countries.”151 As 
I surmised in an earlier article: 
Under this scenario, stronger intellectual property protection will 
appear in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other major cities and 
coastal regions. Meanwhile, the massive piracy and counterfeiting 
problems will stay in China, migrating from the country’s developed 
parts to its less developed parts. To strike a compromise between the 
different regional needs, interests, and development goals, Chinese 
leaders may take some rather “schizophrenic,” or pragmatic, 
positions in designing their intellectual property policies. The 
resulting regional conflicts and rivalries may also become major 
factors affecting the future development of intellectual property 
protection in China.152 
Given these disparities, and the much slower development of the 
Chinese copyright system, China is unlikely to simultaneously 
experience dramatic improvements in the protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights in all the major areas of intellectual property 
rights. Instead, the country’s improvements will vary according to time, 
region, sector, and the type of intellectual property right. If China is to 
cross over from a pirating nation to a nation respectful of intellectual 
property rights, it may experience several crossover points—depending 
on time, region, sector, and the type of intellectual property right.153 
Until China as a whole crosses over from the pirating side of the 
intellectual property divide to the more promising side, it likely will 
have to continue to make policy compromises that often result in 
“schizophrenic” positions in the international intellectual property 
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arena.154 It will indeed be no surprise if China is aligned with the 
developing world with respect to certain issues, but with the developed 
world with respect to others. 
CONCLUSION 
Looking back, it is hard not to be amazed by the turnaround China 
experienced in the intellectual property arena in the past few years. 
Although the country did not have a modern patent system until 1984, it 
is now on track to become the world’s leader in both domestic and 
international patent applications. Taking account of these developments, 
it is not hard to reject as overly simplistic and outdated the picture of 
massive piracy and counterfeiting in China usually painted by 
policymakers, industries, commentators, and the media. It is also not 
difficult to deem as unwise the industries’ continued push for greater 
enforcement, regardless of whether such enforcement could eventually 
backfire on these industries while benefiting their competitors—Chinese 
industries and rights holders.155 
Nonetheless, it is much harder to determine how the future of 
intellectual property protection and enforcement in China will hold. It is 
equally hard to determine whether the promising developments in the 
patent area, and to some extent the trademark area, would be extended 
to the copyright area. To help us better understand this future, this 
Article recalls five key questions that I have been repeatedly asked in 
presentations or conferences exploring recent intellectual property 
developments in China. While the answers reflect neither a rosy picture 
of China’s “great leap forward” in the intellectual property arena nor a 
continuously gloomy picture of pirates and counterfeiters, the picture is 
complex, dualistic, and highly dynamic. It includes both yin and yang. 
In the future, China is likely to see both the yin of continued 
massive piracy and counterfeiting and the yang of China’s rise as an 
intellectual property power at the same time. Although internal 
contradictions are not uncommon in China,156 especially when one takes 
into account the country’s uneven regional, sectoral, and technological 
developments, this complex, dualistic, and highly dynamic picture 
suggests the possibility for a new phenomenon that the world has never 
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seen before. Its unprecedented nature certainly suggests our present 
need to better understand the recent intellectual property developments 
in China and to engage in a deeper assessment of the implications of 
these developments. 
